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On Technology, Capitalism, Art and
Imagination
Interview with Andrew Feenberg by Meike Schmidt-Gleim and Carlos
Pérez López for the Editorial Board of Anthropology & Materialism. A
Journal of Social Research
Meike Schmidt-Gleim, Carlos Pérez López and Andrew Feenberg
 Meike  Schmidt-Gleim,  Carlos  Pérez López:  We  would  like  to  start  with  a  very  general
question about technique and technology as an object of study. In your text “Modernity
Theory and Technology Studies: Reflections on Bridging the Gap” (2003), you claim that
technology  studies  are  split  into  two  opposed  branches:  Essentialist  philosophy  of
technology represented, for instance, by the Heideggerian position, and empirical research
on technology, for instance the Science and Technology Studies. The problem is that the
first branch, while critical of modernity, even anti-modern, is essentializing technology. The
second branch, the empirical research on technologies,  is not essentializing technology,
yet, it ignores the larger issue of modernity and thus appears uncritical, even conformist of
the socio-technical development. Between these two lines of thought, how do you think the
research on technology should be conducted? What are the stakes and what are the means
of pursuing a non-essentialist study of technical life and technology that accounts for the
wider frame of social, ethical and political implications?
Andrew Feenberg:  The distinction between society wide effects of technology and
particular cases is artificial. In reality, the two levels intermingle although it takes
revisions at both methodological extremes to make this work in practice. Both the
speculative  attribution  of  a  specific  “essence”  to  technology  and  a  theoretically
crippling nominalism must  be rejected.  Technologies  realize  values  through their
design and social contextualization. Those values can be traced to specific actors, for
example, in the form of economic interests or customary preferences. But values are
not merely projections of the consciousness and will of actors. They have a life of
their own and manifest themselves at the higher levels of culture as widely shared
ideologies or consensus patterns of belief and practice. At these levels phenomena
speculatively attributed to the essence of technology do actually present themselves.
Thus the claims of a Heidegger cannot be dismissed even if we reject his own account
of those claims.
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Let me offer an example. Every ten or fifteen years a new technology promises to
transform education. I just saw an announcement that virtual reality would soon do
the  trick.  But  the historical  sequence  is  discouraging:  radio,  television,  the  Plato
system, Computer Aided Instruction, the Internet have all made the same promise.
What is the significance of this obsession with the technification of education? I trace
it  to  the  prevalence  of  the  ideology  of  deskilling,  already  formulated  clearly  by
Andrew Ure at the dawn of the industrial revolution in 1835. This ideology is rooted
in  the  problematic  structure  of  capitalism,  which  systematically  dis-incentivizes
workers and therefore requires heavy handed management to succeed in extracting
surplus value. But the ideology is not confined to a single social group such as the
bourgeoisie. Once it becomes hegemonic it invades the most inappropriate domains
of social life with unrealistic claims for technological mediation. It is theorized by
Heidegger, Ellul and other radical critics of technology in this generalized form as
belonging to the essence of technology. By locating it at the level of culture, we can
draw together the perspectives of radical critique and social studies of technology.
 MSG, CPL: Let’s continue with your latest book, Technosystem: The Social  Life of Reason
(2017a). In an interview that you gave at the end of last year, you presented your book as a
reflection on the world we live in: “[…] a world of technical systems designed in accordance
with technical disciplines and operated by personnel trained in those disciplines.” (2017b) 
 In  your  book,  you develop  a  theory  that  helps  us  to  think  about  the  threats  and  the
potentials of the complex technical systems that organize our life. But you also try to look
for ways of intervening into the technical life, in other words, for a transformation of this
configuration  that  makes  up  the  horizon  of  our  experience.  Can  you  explain  how  you
conceive a critical intervention into the technical life? Where and how do you think this
intervention can take place? And what is the role of actors of the technical world (engineers,
designers, software developers, regular users, politicians, scholars and consumers) whose
opinions and desires nourish the dynamics of this system? How is it possible to be part of
“Technosystem” and intervene at the same time critically into this very system?
AF: My basic premises are simple: human knowledge is fallible and there are many
solutions to technical problems with different social implications. If that is so, it must
be true also of technical knowledge. Since our lives are framed by technical systems
the errors and biases in technical knowledge will show up in our experience as flaws
in those systems. I conclude that ordinary human experience has a corrective role in
relation to technical knowledge. One can think of our life inside the technified world
as the reality test technical knowledge must undergo, and our reactions to failures
can be conceived as the basis for another sort of informal technical knowledge from
below.
This simple formulation must of course be expanded and complexified. For example,
what appear as flaws in technical knowledge may be rooted in economic interests or
a professional tradition. How much of what we think of as technical knowledge is
better  understood  as  ideology?  The  very  category  of  knowledge  has  legitimating
functions  in  modern  societies  that  blur  the  line  between  authentic  epistemic
achievements  and  merely  disguised  interests  or  professional  prejudices.  The
distinction  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  choices  among  alternative  technically
rational  problem  solutions  may  be  socially  and  economically  biased.  Then  too,
fallibility  certainly  describes  the  situated  knowledges  of  ordinary  users  of
technology. Terrible mistakes are made, such as the rejection of vaccines. So it is not
clear at all where to place one’s faith, in expert or lay opinion. Yet good results often
On Technology, Capitalism, Art and Imagination
Anthropology & Materialism, 4 | 2019
2
emerge out of the interaction of the two forms of knowledge. Either one on its own
can lead down trajectories of error with catastrophic consequences. 
Modern societies are unusual in achieving a high level of differentiation of technical
work  from  social  life.  That  makes  for  difficulty  in  communication  between  the
makers and the users of technology. The difficulty is exaggerated where either or
both  technical  experts  and  lay  participants  in  technical  life  are  arrogant  and
intolerant  of  criticism.  In  some  cases  institutions  armour  their  technical  cadre
against criticism to protect the interests of dominant actors, best served by biased
technical systems. These are the difficulties with which we contend but they are not
insuperable. In the 1960s and 70s movements of “radical professionals” called into
question the relation of expert and lay in innovative ways. Even in the absence of
such movements and explicit questioning of roles, technical experts serve the public
where the definition of their work has been informed by true public demands. I am
thinking, for example, of engineers engaged in designing renewable energy systems,
a technical response to environmentalist demands articulated in the public sphere. In
sum, we are all as you put it “part of the Technosystem,” but that is the condition,
not an obstacle, to intervention.
 MSG, CPL: The thesis that seems to guide your argument in Technosystem: The Social Life of
Reason asserts that one cannot think of technical rationality without social rationality. This
contrasts with the idea supported by the so-called “essentialist tradition”, which conceives
technology as an autonomous process that is indifferent to human arrangements. In your
opinion, technical rationality – which means efficiency and functionality – affects social life
as  much as  the  latter  determines  and  shapes  technology.  “Rationality”  is  therefore  an
ambivalent  and complex concept  that  turns “technosystem” into a dynamic process of
mutually  interacting  rationalities.  Could  you  explain,  how  those  rationalities  are
distinguished from each other and how they interrelate? May we think of the multiple and
dynamic aspects of "technosystems" as the critical foundation of going beyond essentialist
theory?
AF:  As  explained  earlier,  technical  knowledge  is  fallible  and  biased  and  calls  for
knowledge  from  below  to  correct  and  complete  it.  There  are  thus  two  forms  of
rationality. The rationality of the technical experts is “formal” in the sense that it is
thoroughly elaborated and formulated in highly general (“formal”) propositions. The
social conditions for the production of such knowledge are fairly constant from one
society to another: a cadre of skilled experts must be selected, trained and offered the
material conditions for their cognitive labors. Whether it be Chinese Mandarins or
American urban planners, these are the essential conditions for the production of
differentiated formal knowlege. The knowledge of ordinary people living within the
technical  systems  of  modern  societies  is  very  different.  It  is  not  formalized  and
participation in its production presupposes no special qualifications. This informal
technical knowledge from below responds to the fit between the expectations raised
by the systems and their actual achievements. Every computer user has a mouthful
he or she would like to share with the engineers who designed the damn things! This
is often valid knowledge and often widely enough shared to inspire social movements
and  public  opinion.  Sometimes  it  is  informed  by  technical  experts  who  offer
explanations  and advice,  facilitating  communication  with  established  institutions.
Informal knowledge interacts productively with formal knowledge and is eventually
incorporated into the technical disciplines.
 MSG, CPL: In your text “Critical Theory of Technology: An Overview” (2005) you argue that
in  a  Marxist  perspective  a  main  aspect  of  the  capitalist  system  is  the  control  of  the
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conditions of labor. The capitalist “has not merely an economic interest in what goes on
within his factory, but also a technical interest. By reorganizing the work process, he can
increase production and profits. Control of the work process, in turn, leads to new ideas for
machinery and the mechanization of industry follows in short order.” Could we therefore
conclude  that  capitalism  shapes  technology?  And  if  so,  how  is  technology  shaping
capitalism in turn? 
 You argue further that capitalist interest in the expansion of technical systems also leads
to a technicalization of human relationships along the lines of efficiency. Can you explain
how the capitalist technical system affects human and social relationships, how technical
systems impose impersonal structures of domination? 
AF: These are several huge questions. Capitalism has had an overwhelming influence
on the trajectory of  technical  development  over  the  last  several  centuries  and it
continues to  shape technology today.  Consider,  for  example,  the evolution of  the
Internet from a highly decentralized system based on a uniquely open protocol to
today’s  corporate  dominated  Internet.  A  few  big  companies have  concentrated
control of attention to sell advertizing while all sorts of pathologies (loss of privacy,
waste of energy, viruses, propaganda, fraud) proliferate because they are profitable
or because the old protocol makes it difficult to stop them without interfering with
corporate profits. One can imagine a very different Internet based on the undisturbed
evolution  under  public  control  of  a  largely  peer-to-peer  system.  Perhaps  Estonia
offers a partial example of some of the potentials of such a system.
The pursuit of efficiency characterizes capitalism at every stage, so long as we are
clear that we are not talking about efficiency in the purely technical sense. Many
technically  superior  designs  are  abandoned  for  failing  to  “efficiently”  serve  the
interests  of  the  dominant  enterprises.  This  is  particularly  striking  today  in  the
context of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism aims to colonize the non-market sectors of
society with capitalist style management in order to maximize control. Measures of
efficiency  are  invented  that  justify  the  new  management  procedures,  but  any
unbiased observer of the contemporary university can conclude that the imposition
of ever more management is inefficient in terms of the original purposes of higher
education.  This  case  is  typical  of  what  is  happening  to  professionalized  domains
generally.  Thus  technification  is  not  an  autonomous  process  but has  clear  social
origins  and  can  be  contested  as  such.  The  accusations  of  so-called  “Luddist”
regression  aimed  at  those  who  protest  these  new  forms  of  technification  are
ideological  and  exemplify  the  new  form  that  ideology  takes  in  a  technologically
advanced society.
 MSG, CPL: Walter Benjamin attributed a playful creative potential to technology – if only the
production of technology would not be embedded in capitalist modes of production. Would
you agree with this, and if so, would the abolishment of capitalism give way to a completely
different  and  liberated  technology?  You write  that  technical  action  represents  a  partial
escape from the human condition. Is thus the promise of a better life through technology
valid in your opinion?
AF:  Marcuse  also  entertained  the  idea  of  liberating  not  just  human  beings  but
technology  through  socialist  revolution.  He  discussed  the  rise  of  more  playful
relations to technology possible after World War II which of course Benjamin could
not witness.  And neither Benjamin nor Marcuse could have imagined the further
development around networking and mobile technologies. But these developments
confirm the possibility they asserted of a different type of technology and a different
relation  to  technology.  The  abolition  of  capitalism  would  be  necessary  for  the
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extension of playful technological relations beyond consumption into the production
process  itself.  This  is  not  just  a  dream but  is  already  a  real  dimension  of  a  few
privileged sectors such as work in film and video games and some scientific research.
I would not say that technology enables us to escape the human condition. On the
contrary, it is the human condition. The escapist illusion is precisely the source of
many problems such as environmental pollution. I have no doubt that a better life is
made  possible  by  technology  but  there  is  a  dark  side  to  progress  as  well.  I  am
reminded by your question of the hope scientists placed in “atoms for peace” after
World War II. We were going to have energy so abundant it could be distributed free!
The dark side—nuclear madness—was so horrible that some of those who had created
the  bomb  believed  there  must  be  a  correspondingly  wonderful  bright  side  to
compensate. But it turns out that nuclear technology has no bright side after all. Few
cases are as tragic as this one but unless there is a far more enlightened and effective
reaction to environmental problems, the results may be similar or even worse. 
 MSG, CPL: The topic of our upcoming issue is technology and art. In this context, it is very
interesting to come back to your thoughts on Marcuse’s theory of art and technology. You
write  that,  according  to  Marcuse,  the  distinction  between  technology  as  a  product  of
reason and art having a sensual framework is a result of a modern conception of reason:
“While art has been confined to a marginal realm of «affirmative culture», reason has been
reduced to an instrument in the struggle against scarcity.” (2008)
 The distinction between technology and art is presented as problematic because it is based
on  the  exclusion  of  a  larger  sense  of  reason  as  life-affirming.  Could  a  re-opening  of
technology towards art bring about a shift in the conception of technical rationality?
AF:  This  is  one  of  the  most  speculative  of  the  many  speculative  projections  in
Marcuse’s  thought.  He called for the development of  a new concept of  reason by
which he meant a form of rationality that would go beyond mere instrumentality to
address the potentialities of human beings and nature. Art was to play a role in this
project but not directly in the form of works. Rather the aspect of art relevant to the
reform of rationality was its imaginative relation to reality. Marcuse points out that
the distinction we make between technology and art was unknown to the ancient
Greeks.  Their  concept  of  technē  included  both.  In  practice  this  meant  that  ideal
aesthetic  criteria  were included among the objective  criteria  applied to  technical
making not only in art but also in what we would consider purely technical activities.
Marcuse aims at a similar condensation of the differentiated functions of technique
and art.  Technical  decisions  should  incorporate  ideal  potentials  identified  by  the
imagination. 
But today that would require a different approach than in antiquity. Greek aesthetics
had a traditional basis whereas we moderns cannot base our technical activities on
the past but must anticipate the future. Marcuse never made it quite clear how this
would work but I think he intended aesthetic criteria to emerge from the decisions of
a free population no longer controlled by propaganda and manipulated needs. These
criteria would bring technology into conformity with the potentials of the affected
human and natural objects, contributing to the creation of a peaceful, harmonious
world in which repression and destruction would be reduced to a minimum.
 MSG, CPL: You say that imagination is a link between art and technology as it is involved in
the transcendence of the empirically given. Yet, imagination has no place in the conception
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of technical rationality defined by efficiency and functionality. So how to recombine and
reintegrate imagination into technical rationality?
AF: It is not true that imagination has no place in technical rationality, even today.
All new products stem from an imaginative leap beyond the present world. That leap
is not formalized and so does not belong to the formal disciplines that preside over
technical work, but everyone knows how important it  is  nevertheless.  This is  the
inner limit of the criteria of efficiency and functionality which are not self-sufficient
but always require some external impulse to be set in motion. Of course the case may
appear different when the imaginative leap is made by ordinary people who protest a
particular technological design and are rebuked by the authorities in the name of
efficiency and functionality. We have had enough of those accusations of Luddism
and irrationality addressed to protests against nuclear power and oil pipe lines in
favor of renewal energy! This is a pseudo-rationalism; it masks the embarrassing fact
that much of the content of the contemporary technical disciplines is based on past
imaginative leaps, some even made in response to controversial political pressures.
The problem is not with reliance on rationality but with the artificial restriction of
rationality to a narrow rump. A more generous conception of rationality in a truly
free society would recognize the technical role of the imagination.
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